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The Right to Strike:
How the United States Reduces
it to the Freedom to Strike and
How International Framework
Agreements can Redeem it
EMILY C.M. O’NEILL*

I. INTRODUCTION
After months of attempting to negotiate an agreement on a new contract,
employees of a textile manufacturing company in Star City, Arkansas decided
to strike to improve their bargaining position.1 In response to the strike, the
company hired replacement workers to fill their jobs.2 The company maintained
production for nearly two years, keeping the replacement workers on the job
permanently. Even after the workers had decided to end their strike and return
to work, the company refused to reinstate them.3

* 		 J.D., American University Washington College of Law; B.A. Political Science,
2005 Macalester College. I would like to thank Professor Fernanda Nicola for her
indispensable guidance in the development of this article and my partner, family,
and friends for their support. Additional thanks to the editors of the Labor and
Employment Law Forum.
1.		 See Lance Compa, Human Rights Watch, Violations of Workers’ Freedom of
Association in the United States by European Multinational Corporations 107-09 (2010),
available at http://www.hrw.org/node/92719 (describing the circumstances preceding the
strike, in which the employer’s demands for the new contract would amount to effectively
stripping benefits, rights, and protections built up over years of negotiations).
2.			 See id. at 109 (explaining that hiring replacement workers was the logical and
legal next step after the company decided to continue operations).
3.			 See id. at 111 (indicating that management declined the striking workers’ offer to
negotiate a return to work once they decided to end their strike).
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The company was a U.S. subsidiary of a Netherlands-based multinational
corporation (“MNC”).4 While the company’s hire of permanent replacements
is legal in the U.S., the practice is virtually unheard of in the Netherlands,
where labor rights are considered fundamental human rights.5 Moreover,
the Dutch MNC publicly touted its commitment to core International Labor
Organization (“ILO”) Conventions on workers’ rights, under which the use of
permanent strike replacements has been proscribed as incompatible with and a
derogation of the fundamental right to strike.6
An increasingly global economy facilitates the ability of companies like
the Dutch MNC to exploit loopholes and weak protections of workers’ rights
in host countries, exacerbating the asymmetrical balance of power between
businesses and workers.7 When a company expands internationally, workers
lose bargaining strength against that company, which can now hire abroad,
where it is not necessarily held to the laws on wages, hours, and worker safety
of its home country.8

4.			 See id. at 109 (identifying Gamma Holding as the MNC, employing 65,000
workers in forty-two countries); see Robin F. Hansen, Multinational Enterprise Pursuit
of Minimized Liability: Law, International Business Theory and the Prestige Oil Spill,
26 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 410, 414 (2008) (defining MNC as a multinational actor that
coordinates its activities to generate profits on an aggregate level).
5.		 See Taco van Peijpe, Employed or Self-Employed? The Role and Content of
the Legal Distinction: Independent Contractors and Protected Workers in Dutch Law,
21 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 127, 151-52 (1999) (discussing trade union rights in the
Netherlands as having their origins in international instruments such as the European
Social Charter and ILO Conventions, which set out workers’ rights to collective action,
including the right to strike, as fundamental).
6.			 See Lance Compa, Human Rights Watch, Unfair Advantage: Workers’ Freedom
of Association in the United States Under International Human Rights Standards 107-08
(2000) (providing the language of the company’s Code of Conduct on its commitment to
social responsibility, in which it states its recognition of its employees’ right to organize
to protect their collective and individual interests, citing ILO Conventions 87 and 98
on the freedom of association and the rights to organize and bargain collectively); cf.
Int’l Lab. Org., Freedom of Ass’n Comm., Complaint Against the Government of the
United States Presented by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO), ¶ 92 Case No. 1543, Report No. 272 (May 1991) [hereinafter
ILO Complaint Against the United States, Case No. 1543] (expressing the ILO
Committee on’s position that the use of striker replacements is a violation of the right to
strike, one of the essential means through which workers defend their interests).
7.			 See The World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair
Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All 77 (2004), available at http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf (contrasting MNCs’ growing influence through
economic power with the diminished influence of trade unions, which have traditionally
been the counterweight to the power of business, caused by increased mobility of
businesses seeking lower production costs).
8.			 See Verena Schmidt, Editorial Overview, in Trade Union Responses to
Globalization: A Review by the Global Union Research Network 1, 3 (Verena Schmidt
ed., 2007) (pointing out that while the enhanced coordination of economic activity
between countries has benefited corporate governance, it has negatively impacted labor
rights by placing high value on inexpensive labor, reducing the relevance of national
labor legislation in many countries).
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World-wide competition results in the weakening of protections for workers.
As governments compete to attract international investors through “businessfriendly” labor legislation that reflects downward pressure on costs, worker
protections are often sacrificed.9 This “race to the bottom” underscores the
need for effective international labor standards.10
The ILO is generally viewed as the principal authoritative organization
charged with development and promotion of international labor standards.11
While there is a consensus that the ILO’s core principles set the floor for
global rules for labor in the world economy, 12 U.S. labor law and practice often
does not even meet this minimum standard, despite its insistence that other
states adopt international labor standards.13 In fact, the U.S. itself has ratified
only two of the ILO’s eight core labor Conventions.14 This Note examines
the inadequacy of U.S. labor law in safeguarding one key ILO principle: the
guarantee of the right to strike.15 It argues that under current U.S. labor law,

9.			 See Harry Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: The
Benjamin Aaron Lecture, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 271, 281 (2001) (describing
the two models of labor policies adopted by countries in the context of globalization:
the first involves a structural change to the economy to prevent wage-driven inflation
from reducing profits, the second involves a failure to reform national labor law to adjust
globalization’s new threats to worker protections).
10.			 See, e.g., Phillip R. Seckman, Invigorating Enforcement Mechanisms of the
International Labor Organization in Pursuit of U.S. Objectives, 32 Denv. J. Int’l L.
& Pol’y 675, 678–88 (2004) (illustrating the negative impact of increased mobility of
capital and absence of labor law enforcement on U.S. workers’ willingness to organize
for better protections for fear of an employer moving operations abroad as a race to the
bottom; explaining that the ILO uses Conventions to establish a minimum for worker
protections and its recommendations to promote higher standards).
11.			 See id. at 684 (explaining that while other sources for international labor law
exist, the ILO’s conventions and recommendations constitute the foundational principles
through which the organization carries out its mandate to improve labor standards).
12.			 See The World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, supra
note 7, at 91 (declaring that the consensus that ILO principles provide a minimum set of
global rules for labor exists among those in the labor movement, arising out of a concern
for the impact increased economic competition has on labor standards).
13. . See Arthurs, supra note 9, at 286 (pointing out the inconsistencies in the U.S.
position that countries that do not adhere to core labor standards should be denied
membership in the WTO with the U.S.’s own failure to ratify ILO Conventions that
establish the core standards).
14.			 See Int’l Trade Union Confed. [ITUC], Internationally Recognized Core Labour
Standards in the United States of America, Report for the WTO General Council Review
of the Trade Policies of the United States of America at 1 (Sep. 29 & Oct. 1, 2010),
available at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/finalUS_CLS_2010.pdf (identifying the
two core ILO Conventions ratified by the U.S.: the Convention on the Worst Forms of
Child Labor and the Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labor).
15.			 The right to strike is embodied in the principles of freedom of association and the
rights to organize and bargain collectively. See discussion infra Part I.A.2; see also Steve
Charnovitz, The ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and its Future in the United
States, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 90, 93 (quoting the ILO 1998 Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, which reinforces the fundamental status of the freedom
of association and right to collective bargaining and obligates member states to respect,
promote, and realize the principle).
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which allows employers to hire permanent replacements for striking workers
the right to strike is stripped of protections and rendered a ‘freedom’ to strike.
Notwithstanding globalization’s negative impact on workers’ rights,
it also presents opportunities for fostering workplace democracy and
defending workers’ interests.16 The proliferation of MNCs creates openings
for transnational collaboration of labor organizations in confronting global
employers and demanding improved working conditions.17 In this context, this
Note will explore the potential of International Framework Agreements (“IFAs”)
to bring U.S.-based companies into compliance with international standards on
the right to strike. Negotiated between global unions and MNCs, IFAs establish
an ongoing relationship between the parties and ensure that the MNC respects
the same standards in all the countries in which it operates.18 MNCs that sign
IFAs commit to adhere to the four fundamental principles and rights at work,
as articulated by the ILO.19 Importantly, IFAs, which are predominantly based
in Europe, frequently reach beyond conduct of the signatory parent MNC, to

16.			 See Schmidt, supra note 8, at 3 (pointing out that notwithstanding globalization’s
obstacles to organizing, which has historically been done at national levels, opportunities
also exist; for example lobbying international institutions and building alliances with
non-governmental organizations).
17.			 See id. at 1 (acknowledging that globalization has enabled workers to negotiate
transnationally through creative tactics involving broader networking and transnational
alliance building with other workers and engagement with international organizations
to influence their policies); cf. Lisa P. Rudikoff, Symposium, International Framework
Agreements: A Collaborative Paradigm for Labor Relations, Global Working L. Papers,
2005, at 1-2, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/global/workingpapers/ 2005/ECM_
DLV_015787 (discussing the impact of the “race to the bottom,” characterized by underenforcement of labor rights by states to attract investment, as the impetus for adopting
new strategies and methods of organizing workers among unions).
18.			 See Press Release, Int’l Lab. Org.,, International Framework Agreements: A
Global Tool for Supporting Rights at Work (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.ilo.
org/global/about-the-ilo/press-and-media-centre/press-releases/WCMS_ 080723/lang--en/
index.htm (providing responses to an interview with Dominique Michel, Team Leader of
ILO’s Multinational Enterprise Program).
19.			 These four principles are (1) prohibition of forced labor; (2) prohibition of
discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, and religion; (3) prohibition of child
labor; and (4) freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. See Kimberly
Ann Elliott & Richard B. Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Globalization?
12 (Inst. for Int’l Econ. 2003) (generalizing that while the content of IFAs vary with
regards to other various ILO standards, they all, at minimum, refer to the core ILO
Core Conventions); see also Renee-Claude Drouin, Objectionable Work: Promoting
Fundamental Labor Rights Through International Framework Agreements: Practical
Outcomes and Present Challenges, 31 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 591, 594 (2010)
(maintaining that the four core standards constitute the minimum commitment required
by global unions as a condition of signing an agreement).
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actors along the supply chain, subsidiaries and suppliers, which are frequently
based in the United States.20
This Note examines how the U.S. policy on permanent strike replacements
deviates from ILO principles on the right to strike. By permitting employers
to hire permanent replacements for striking workers, the United States fails to
live up to its commitment as a member of the ILO to respect and promote this
fundamental right. Part I will explore IFAs as a potential tool to bring U.S.
companies into compliance with ILO principles on the right to strike, exceeding
their obligations under domestic labor law. Part II reviews the role of the ILO
in establishing international labor standards and the right to strike under such
standards.21 Additionally, Part II examines the right to strike in the United
States and how it has been interpreted in case law.22 Finally, part II discusses
IFAs and their use in promoting global labor standards among MNCs.23 Part III
analyzes the extent to which the United States’ permanent strike replacement
policy contravenes international principles by stripping down the ‘right’ to a
mere ‘freedom’ to strike.24 Part III next explores the potential of IFAs to bring
U.S.-based subsidiaries of signatory MNCs into compliance with international
norms on the right to strike despite the U.S. government’s failure to comply
with the ILO.25 Finally, Part IV recommends that the U.S. should ratify the
two ILO Conventions that form the basis of the right to strike and global
unions should strengthen their enforcement mechanisms to ensure that U.S.
companies are adhering to the international norms of the right to strike.26

20.			As large companies are increasingly subcontracting their production processes,
corporate chains of activity often stretch over huge distances, spanning vast networks
of production. See Jane Wills, Bargaining for the Space to Organize in the Global
Economy: A Review of the Accor-IUF Trade Union Rights Agreement, 9 Rev. Int’l Pol.
Economy 675, 680 (2002); see also Peter Wilke & Kim Schütze, Background Paper on
International Framework Agreements for a Meeting of the Restructuring Forum Devoted
to Transnational Agreements at Company Levels 5 (Jun. 2008), available at http://www.
anticipationofchange.eu/fileadmin/anticipation/Logos/ Documents/new_set_5509/pres/
Wiltke.pdf (emphasizing that the enforcement of international labor laws by MNCs to
subsidiaries and suppliers is one of the most important features of IFAs in that it requires
employers to be more amenable and respectful to workers that wish to unionize).
21.			 See discussion, infra Part II.A (explaining the purpose and functions of the ILO,
which is to establish a minimum, global standard of labor rights to protect workers from
the exploitations arising out of globalized economic competition).
22.			 See discussion, infra Part II.B (discussing the National Labor Relations Act as the
primary source of labor law in the United States and evaluating the right to strike it has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court with regard to permanent strike replacements).
23.			 See discussion, infra Part II.C (explaining the origins of IFAs in connection with
corporate social responsibility and confronting globalization’s effects on workers’ rights).
24.			 See discussion, infra Part III.A (analyzing how the use of permanent strike
replacements results in the reduction of the ‘right’ to strike to the ‘freedom’ to strike by
removing the employer duty to refrain from interference with the exercise of the right,
thereby stripping protections for workers).
25.			 See discussion, infra Part III.B (arguing that IFAs bind suppliers and subsidiaries
to ILO norms even when they exceed the standards of the countries in which they
operate).
26.			 See discussion, infra Part IV (discussing means of strengthening the
implementation of IFAs to promote MNC compliance).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. International Labor Standards Under the ILO
1. The ILO’s Role in International Labor Law
The ILO is the principal organization charged with promoting international
norms on labor rights.27 A principal motivation behind the formation of the ILO
at the beginning of the twentieth century was to promote a fair and inclusive
process of globalization.28 The ILO sought to enhance worker protections in
all member states to both reduce the competitive disadvantage faced by states
with greater protections, and to prevent the exploitation of lax labor regulations
at the expense of workers.29 To this end, the ILO adopts and implements
international labor standards such as the right to form trade unions and bargain
collectively; the protection from child labor, forced labor, and discrimination;
the guarantee of safe and healthy working conditions; and social security.30
Members of the United Nations automatically become members of the ILO,
and states that are not United Nations members can become members of the
ILO by approval of a qualified majority of the International Labor Conference.31

27.			 See Lee Swepston, Human Rights Complaint Procedures of the International
Labor Organization, in Guide to International Human Rights Practice 85, 85
(Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed. 1999) (providing that the ILO was established in 1919 as the
leading organization in establishing international mechanisms for the protection of labor
rights).
28.			 See Int’l Lab. Org.,, ILO History, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/ history.
htm (identifying three motivations behind the formation of the ILO: (1) humanitarian,
reflecting a concern for diminished conditions of exploited workers; (2) political, out
of fear that workers’ inability to improve their conditions might lead to unrest and even
revolt; and (3) economic, to promote fair competition); see also Schmidt, supra note 8,
at 8 (noting that even before globalization existed, the ILO Declaration of Philadelphia in
1944 laid the foundation for the organization’s work on fair globalization by emphasizing
the social injustices created by transnational business).
29.			 See id. (observing that higher costs of production stemming from greater
protections for workers disadvantages competitors and creates a disincentive for countries
to regulate labor conditions within their borders).
30.			 See Swepston, Human Rights Complaint Procedures of the International Labor
Organization, supra note 27, at 86 (explaining that the ILO adopts international labor
standards through conventions and recommendations that are subsequently promoted
through ratification by member states, which requires them to implement them into
national law).
31.		See Matteo Borzaga, Company and Labor Law: Accommodating Differences:
Discrimination and Equality at Work in International Labor Law, 30 Vt. L. Rev. 749,
753 (2006) (explaining that this is a departure from the ILO’s original conditions of
membership, which made members of the League of Nations automatic membership to
the ILO).
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2. Freedom of Association and Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively as
Fundamental Principles of International Labor Law
Recognized in the preamble of the 1919 Constitution of the ILO, workers’
freedom of association is a foundational principle in international labor
law.32 In 1948, the ILO codified freedom of association when it adopted the
Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize (“Convention No. 87”), declaring workers’ right to establish and join
trade unions.33 The following year, in 1949, the ILO adopted the Convention
on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (Convention No. 98)
as a follow-up to the previous year’s session.34 These two Conventions are
treated integrally as one collective right of workers to organize to defend their
interests.35
Convention 87 provides workers with the right to form and join
organizations.36 The guarantee of freedom of association is the most fundamental
of rights to workers because it allows for the exercise of all other rights.37 Most
significantly, workers’ right to organize and the right to collectively bargain
flow from this basic right.38
Convention 98 allows workers to engage their employer in pursuit of
their interests as one collective entity, without interference, retaliation, or

32.			 See Harold Dunning, The Origins of Convention No. 87 on Freedom of
Association and the Right to Organize, 137 Int’l Lab. Rev. 149, 163 (1998) (providing
that the principle would later be codified in 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, which is
contained in the Constitution, as the second of four fundamental principles on which the
Organization is based; emphasizing that importantly, membership of the ILO requires
formal acceptance of obligations in the Constitution, including both the Preamble and
the Declaration of Philadelphia, both of which embody the principle of freedom of
association).
33.			Int’l Lab. Org., Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organise, 68 U.N.T.S 17 (1948) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 87].
34. .	Int’l Lab. Org.,, Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the
Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively, 96 U.N.T.S 257 (1949) [hereinafter ILO
Convention No. 98].
35.			 See Dunning, supra note 32, at 163 (contending that the right to organize and
bargain collectively, embodied in Convention 98, enlarged the principles of freedom of
association to make them better suited to enactment and practice).
36.			 ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 33, art. 2 (“Workers and employers, without
distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of
the organization concerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without previous
authorization”).
37.			 See Compa, Unfair Advantage, supra note 6, at 13 (explaining that this freedom
is the foundation upon which all other labor rights under international law rest, such as
how, for example, the right of workers to organize to improve working conditions is
based in their freedom of association at the workplace).
38.			 See id. (describing the right to bargain collectively as the practical
implementation of the ideals represented in the rights of association and organizing).
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discrimination with respect to their employment.39 The purpose of this right
is to give workers a unified voice to equalize the power relationship between
management and gain favorable terms of employment.40
The principles embodied in the Conventions are based on the recognition
that the inherently unequal employer-employee relationship undermines fair
negotiation of individual worker contracts.41 Collective bargaining can create
a greater balance of power in the employment relationship and enable workers
to negotiate dignified terms of employment.42 The Conventions guarantee
workers the freedom to take collective action to defend their workplace
interests and promote the exercise of trade union rights by prohibiting antiunion discrimination and acts that interfere with collective action.43
The United States has not ratified either of these Conventions, but
nonetheless must respect the principles as a member of the ILO.44 In its 1998
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (“Declaration”),
the ILO stated that, of the more than 180 Conventions it has adopted, eight
should be considered fundamental.45 Included in the eight enumerated in the

39.			 See ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 34, arts. 1, 2(1) (providing protection
from calculated dismissals from work or other prejudice in retaliation for union activity;
declaring that workers’ organizations shall be free from employer interference).
40.			 See Compa, Unfair Advantage, supra note 6, at 13 (explaining workers’ choice
of collective representation over individual bargaining with an employer as the basis for
organizing).
41.			 See Bernard Gernigon, Int’l Lab. Org., Collective Bargaining: Sixty Years After
its International Recognition 1 International Workers’ Symposium, CSAC98/2009 (Oct.
12-15, 2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/--actrav/documents/meetingdocument/ wcms_114972.pdf (identifying the basis of the
ILO’s recognition of the principle of collective bargaining as an acknowledgement of the
economic inequality that exists in the employment relationship); see also Otto KahnFreund & Bob Hepple, Laws Against Strikes, in International Comparisons and
Social Policy 6 (1972) (arguing that the only way to address the dominant influence of
accumulated capital is through the unified effort of workers).
42.			 See id. at 1 (assessing that the balance arises out of the fact that workers can be
represented by trade unions that engage in discussions with an employer about terms of
employment).
43.			 See id. (considering the significance of the ILO’s recognition of collective
bargaining rights as giving an international dimension to an already common practice in
industrialized countries).
44.			 See Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 90 (providing that while the United States voted
for the ILO’s adoption of Convention 98, the government’s position for not ratifying it
was based on the assumption that freedom of association was already recognized in the
U.S. Constitution); see also Gernigon, supra note 41, at 2 (reporting that ratification of
Convention 98 by region is highest in Europe (100%), Africa (98%), and the Americas
(91%)). See generally discussion infra Parts III (discussing the U.S. commitment to
respect, promote, and implement certain ILO principles as fact of membership).
45.			 See Melissa Torres, Labor Rights and the ATCA: Can the ILO’s Fundamental
Rights Be Supported through ATCA Litigation?, 37 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 447,
455 (2004) (identifying the origins of the 1998 Declaration at the 1995 World Summit
on Social Development in Copenhagen, “where the heads of state first acknowledged
the existence of certain fundamental workers’ rights, including the right to organize and
bargain collectively”).
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Declaration are the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining,
derived from Conventions 87 and 98.46 Importantly, the Declaration states
that all members, irrespective of ratification of the principal Conventions in
question, have an obligation to respect, promote, and realize in good faith the
eight fundamental principles, which arise from the very fact of membership
in the ILO.47 Thus, while the United States has not ratified Conventions 87
and 98, the U.S. nonetheless has an obligation to respect the fundamental ILO
principles of freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Pursuant to this obligation, member states that have not ratified
all of the Conventions relevant to the Declaration, like the United States, must
submit annual reports on their progress in implementing the fundamental
rights enshrined in the Declaration.48 Additionally, the ILO issues a Global
Report based, in part, on findings of the member states’ annual follow-ups.49
3. The ILO on the Right to Strike
The right to strike has been established by the ILO as an essential
tool for workers to exercise their freedom of association and right to
organize.50Although the right is not explicitly stated in the ILO Constitution or
expressly recognized in ILO Conventions 87 and 98, ILO supervisory bodies51
have firmly established the right as an essential element of union rights for
decades.52 Although no amendment establishing the right was ever submitted
46.			International Labour Conference, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work and Annex, Int’l Legal Materials, Jun. 18, 1998, at 1234, available
at 1998 WL 778019. [hereinafter ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles] The other
three rights, also derived from previously adopted Conventions are the elimination of
all forms of forced or compulsory labor; the effective abolition of child labor; and the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
47.			 Id. at 1237.
48..		 Id. at 1238–39 (establishing the follow-up mechanism as a review of efforts made
by member states to accord with the Declaration and ultimately promote full compliance).
49.			 Id. at 1239 (providing that the Global Report is drawn up under the responsibility
of the Director-General with the purpose of providing a global picture on adherence to the
four fundamental principles of the Declaration, which can then be used to set priorities
and plans for cooperation in the implementation of the rights).
50.			 See Int’l Lab. Org., Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and
Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body
of the ILO ¶ 145 (5th rev. ed. 2006) [hereinafter ILO Digest of Decisions of the CFA]
(declaring the right to strike a fundamental corollary of principles of Conventions 87 and
98).
51.			 See Int’l Lab. Org., Applying and Promoting Int’l Labour Standards, http://
www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/
lang--en/index.htm (discussing the ILO’s supervisory bodies examining of reports on
member states’ implementation of ILO labor standards based on submissions by member
states and observations of workers’ and employers’ organizations.)
52.			 See, e.g., Int’l Lab. Org., Freedom of Association and Collective
Bargaining: The Right to Strike, Report III Part 4B ¶136, 1994, http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/english/surveyq.htm [hereinafter “freedom of association”] (click “1994, Freedom
of association and collective bargaining” hyperlink; then “1994, The right to strike”)
(explaining that strikes are often a last resort for worker organizations trying to secure
their demands),
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during the Conference, the right to strike appears several times in a report
prepared for the first discussion of Convention 87.53 Absent express provisions
on the right to strike, the ILO supervisory bodies, set up to supervise the
application of ILO standards, have had to interpret the meaning and scope of
the right to strike from Conventions 87 and 98.54 The main supervisory body,
the Committee on Freedom of Association, recognizes the right as an “intrinsic
corollary” to the freedom of association protected by Convention 87.55 As early
as its second meeting, the Committee affirmed the principle of the right to
strike as an essential element of trade union rights, and one recognized by most
countries as one of the essential and principal means through which workers
defend their economic interests.56 The ILO Committee of Experts has similarly
“read in” the right to strike in Conventions 87 and 98.57 Article 8 of Convention
87 declares that no national law may impair the guarantees of the Convention,
including the right to strike.58
4. The ILO’s Lack of Enforcement Power
While the ILO plays a critical role in defining global labor standards, it
lacks the authority to enforce such standards.59 The principal mechanism for
dealing with freedom of association violations is a complaint procedure, which
allows workers’ organizations to bring complaints to the ILO’s Committee
on Freedom of Association against a member state.60 Unlike the ILO’s other
supervisory bodies which only review complaints against ratifying countries
53.			 See id. at ¶ 142 (conceding that only one ILO Convention, on the Abolition
of Forced Labour (No. 105) mentions strike action, although it appears in various
resolutions, conferences, and Recommendations, but emphasizing that nonetheless the
ILO is the primary source of law regarding the right to strike; speculating that the right to
strike does not appear in the text of Conventions 87 and 98 because it was so basic so as
to be taken for granted by the Committee).
54.			 See id. at ¶ 145 (explaining the role of supervisory bodies within the ILO, which
is to examine complaints of violations of freedom of association, and identifying the
Committee on Freedom of Association as the principal body).
55.			 See Freedom of Association, supra note 30, at ¶ 523 (reasoning that the most
powerful tool workers have to demand recognition and respect for their interests).
56.			 See id. at ¶¶ 136, 520 (recognizing that strike action is both the most visible form
of collective action in the event of a labor dispute, but also the last resort of workers’ in
pursuit of their demands); see also Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining,
supra note 55, at ¶ 146 (noting that the Committee has never departed from its position
that the right to strike is an essential right grounded in the principles of Conventions 87
and 98).
57.			 See Freedom of Association, supra note 52, at ¶¶ 145–51 (declaring generally the
right to strike as an essential means for workers to defend their interests growing out of
freedom of association and right to organize and bargain collectively).
58.			 See ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 33, at art. 8(2) (prohibiting governments
from interfering with workers’ activities aimed at defending and promoting their
interests).
59.			 See Torres, supra note 45, at 454–55 (acknowledging that the ILO’s standards,
embodied in Conventions and Recommendations, are non-binding instruments intended
to set guidelines for national regulation).
60.			 See Swepston, supra note 27, at 95–96 (noting that this is a special procedure
established exclusively for violations of freedom of association).
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of the particular Convention, the Committee on Freedom of Association can
examine complaints regardless of whether the offending state has ratified the
Convention in question.61 If a violation is found, the Committee will issue
recommendations outlining corrective measures to bring the offending member
state into conformity with ILO principles.62 The ILO’s weakness lies in its
lack of established mechanisms to enforce compliance.63 The ILO, like other
international organizations, contemplates reliance on the participation of nonstate entities to be effective.64 As this Note demonstrates, IFAs are a promising
mechanism to create a formalized space for private actors, particularly workers
and unions, to play a meaningful role in promoting ILO principles in the
United States. Their potential lies in their ability to (1), hold private companies
operating in the U.S. to international standards where national law fails to, and
(2), ultimately spur the United States to revise its labor law by systematically
bringing to light its shortcomings.
B. Labor Law in the United States
The National Labor Relations Act provides employees the right to strike.65
Under what is known as the Mackay Doctrine, employers may hire permanent
replacements for workers that strike over wages and working conditions.66
1. The National Labor Relations Act as the Source of U.S. Labor Law
The NLRA is the central instrument for protecting workers’ rights to
organize and bargain collectively in the United States.67 The guarantee of
workers’ freedom of association, along with the rights to organize, bargain
collectively, and strike is outlined in the heart of the Act, commonly referred to

61.			 See Lee Swepston, Human Rights Law and Freedom of Association, Development
Through ILO Supervision, 137 Int’l Lab. Rev. 169, 175 (1998) (explaining that the
Committee’s authority is grounded in the ILO Constitution and, therefore, complaints can
be filed against any member State).
62.			 See Swepston supra note 27, at 97 (providing as an example that the ILO
may recommend to governments that they refrain from taking certain actions or amend
existing legislation).
63.			 See John C. Knapp, The Boundaries of the ILO: A Labor Rights Argument for
Institutional Cooperation, 29 Brook. J. Int’l L. 369, 380 (2003) (providing that a
principal challenge to widespread implementation of ILO principles has been the ILO’s
inability to impose legal sanctions on noncompliant member states).
64.			 See Schmidt, supra note 8, at 9 (emphasizing the key role that civil society,
particularly unions, play in the enforcement of ILO labor standards because they are in a
better position to monitor compliance).
65.			 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–58 (2006) (providing that
nothing in the Act shall be construed so as to interfere with the right to strike).
66.			NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–47 (1938).
67.			 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
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as “Section 7 rights.”68 The NLRA grants the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB”) administrative authority to enforce the NLRA.69 The NLRB
exercises this power primarily by investigating unfair labor practice charges and
providing remedial, not punitive, action when violations of the Act are found.70
Section 158(a) sets forth unfair labor practices of employers, proscribed by the
Act, including: interference, restraint, or coercion of employees in the exercise
of their Section 7 rights; discrimination of employees that exercise their right
to organize; and refusal to bargain with workers’ chosen representative.71
The United States has not ratified ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on the basis
that national law already promotes the principles of freedom of association,
the right to organize, and collective bargaining.72 However, as previously
discussed, the ILO 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work commits member states to the proposition that membership implies
an obligation to respect certain fundamental principles, including the freedom
of association and the right to organize.73 Nonetheless, the U.S. government
has actually acknowledged to the ILO its failure to fully protect the rights to
organize and bargain collectively through existing law.74
2. Right to Strike Under U.S. Labor Law
The right to strike is protected under the NLRA in Sections 7 and 13.
Section 7 guarantees the right of workers to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining.75 Section 13 explicitly states that nothing
in the Act shall be construed so as to interfere or otherwise impede the right

68.			 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (“[e]mployees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”).
69.			 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2006).
70.			 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
71.			 Id.
72.			 Cf. Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 91 (discussing that, while the United States
voted for the ILO’s adoption of Convention No. 98, the government’s position for
not ratifying it was based on the assumption that freedom of association was already
recognized in the U.S. Constitution).
73.			 See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles, supra note 46, at 1233
(reaffirming the principles articulated in Conventions 87 and 98 as one of four
fundamental rights, and stating that all member States have an obligation to respect,
promote, and realize such principles, regardless of ratification, on the basis of
membership).
74.			 See Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 104 (referring to a 2000 report by the U.S.
government to the ILO on the status of Convention 87 in the United States in which
it admitted shortcomings in its legislation preventing it from complying with the
Convention).
75.			 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities . . . .”).
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to strike.76 Read together with the Section 158(a)’s proscriptions of employer
conduct, these provisions protect workers from retaliation for exercising the
right to strike.77
U.S. law, however, permits an employer to hire permanent replacements for
employees engaged in an economic strike.78 The law was established by the
Supreme Court in 1938 in NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company and
has subsequently become known as the Mackay doctrine.79 The Court reasoned
that just because workers have the right to strike to secure an advantageous
bargaining position, employers do not lose their right to replace the strikers to
carry on with business.80 Under the Mackay doctrine, an employer is free to
fill vacancies left open by economic strikers with replacement workers, and is
not obligated to discharge the hired replacements to create space for workers
wishing to return at the end of the strike.81 As this Note will demonstrate,
the permanent-replacement doctrine significantly weakens the strike as an
economic weapon for workers to enforce their collective bargaining rights, to
the point of rendering it a mere privilege, not a right.82
C. IFAs as a Tool for Promoting MNC Compliance with International
Labor Principles
IFAs open the door to collective bargaining by creating a space that alters
the traditionally antagonistic employer-employee engagement and is more

76.			 See § 163 (“Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein,
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.”).
77.			 See § 158 (declaring interference with workers’ exercise of rights an unfair labor
practice).
78.			 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–56 (1938)
(distinguishing between “economic strikers” and “unfair labor practice strikers” and
ruling, in part, that an employer is not bound to discharge workers hired to fill the places
of strikers in order to create places for the strikers upon their subsequent election to
return to work). But cf. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1368 (1968) (holding that an
employer whose workers strike over the employer’s unfair labor practice must reinstate
the striking employees to their former positions, discharging replacements hired during
the strike if necessary).
79.			 See Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333 at 345 (holding that an employer reserves
the right to hire permanent replacements for employees on strike while noting that
such employees retain employment status and, upon an unconditional offer to return,
are eligible for reinstatement in the event the replacement worker leaves and a position
becomes open).
80.			 See id. (elaborating that an employer is not obligated to discharge those workers
he hires to fill spots left open by striking employees).
81.			 See id. at 345–46 (maintaining, without explanation, that such action does not
constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 13 of the NLRA).
82.			 See discussion, infra Part III. B. (clarifying that the significance of the difference
between a right and a privilege is greater than mere semantics; unlike a right, which is
protected by a corresponding duty restricting interference with the exercise of the right, a
privilege is a mere freedom to act and imposes no duty upon another party).
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hospitable to the organizing process.83 MNC commitment to respect the
core ILO principles of freedom of association and the rights to organize and
collectively bargain through IFAs are instrumental to realizing that purpose.84
1. The Creation and Proliferation of International Framework Agreements
An IFA is an agreement negotiated between an MNC and typically85 a global
union86 to establish an ongoing relationship between the signatories and ensure
adherence to uniform labor standards by the MNC in all countries in which it
operates.87 IFAs are the first and only formally-negotiated instruments between
unions and corporations at the global level and a significant development in
labor relations.88 Since the signing of the first IFA in 1988, they have spread at
a steadily increasing rate. 89 Their proliferation since 2000 has been especially
dramatic—with the number of IFAs signed in 2003-2006 nearly doubling the
number signed in the first fifteen years.90 By 2008, approximately sixty-five

83.			 See Rudikoff, supra note 17, at 8 (emphasizing that IFAs stimulate unionization
by ensuring that employers refrain from interfering with workers in the collective
bargaining process).
84.			 See Elliott & Freeman, supra note 19, at 12 (explaining that the freedom of
association is the most controversial core standard because it increases the power of
workers by creating a mechanism for raising and negotiating solutions to workplace
issues).
85.			 See Nikolaus Hammer, International Framework Agreements: Global Industrial
Relations Between Rights and Bargaining, 11 Transfer Eur. Rev. Lab. & Res. 511,
523 (2005), available at http://trs.sagepub.com/content/11/4/511.full.pdf (acknowledging
that not all IFAs include a global union as a signatory).
86.			 See Rudikoff, supra note 17, at 3 n.9 (defining global unions as international
representatives of national unions that organize in specific sectors).
87.			 See Arturo Bronstein, International and Comparative Labour Law:
Current Challenges 115 (Palgrave Macmillan, Int’l Labour Office 2009) (suggesting
that IFAs are one of the developments of industrial relations in the age of globalization).
88.			 See Dimitris Stevis & Terry Boswell, International Framework Agreements,
Opportunities and Challenges for Global Unionism, in Global Unions: Challenging
Transnational Capital Through Cross-Border Campaigns 174, 180 (Kate
Brofenbrenner ed., 2007) (noting that transnational companies refused to negotiate
with unions until the late 1990s); see also Dimitris Stevis, International Framework
Agreements and Global Social Dialogue, Int’l Lab. Org., Emp’t Sector, Working
Paper No. 47 at 5 (2010) (identifying employer recognition of a global entity that
represents workers interlocutors as both the key characteristic and breakthrough of IFAs).
89.			 See Hammer, supra note 85, at 515 (identifying the social dialogue between
Danone, a French dairy products company, and the International Union of Food Workers
(IUF), a world-wide federation of workers, as the first that resulted in an IFA).
90.			 See Konstantinos Papadakis, Introduction to Cross-Border Social
Dialogue and Agreements: An Emerging Global Industrial Relations
Framework? 1, 2-3 (Konstantinos Papadakis ed., 2008) (documenting that twenty-three
IFAs were signed from 1988–2002 versus thirty-three signed from 2003–2006).
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agreements had been concluded.91 At the end of 2010, that number had jumped
to seventy-six.92
2. Context of Framework Agreements: Corporate Social Responsibility
While both corporate codes of conduct and IFAs can be traced to a consumerdriven push for corporate social responsibility, a key difference separates
the two: credibility. In the late 1980’s, MNCs in the United States began to
respond to campaigns by non-governmental organizations accusing MNCs of
international human rights abuses by elaborating internal codes of conduct.93
These codes, unilaterally written and implemented, tend to be vague and
provide for no enforcement mechanism.94 The voluntary, self-enforcing nature
of these commitments has led critics to conclude that they are mere marketing
ploys lacking in credibility or having any real social impact.95
IFAs were developed, in part, as an alternative to corporate codes of conduct
to raise labor standards.96 Unlike unilateral codes, IFAs are negotiated between
the two principal actors—employers and workers—in the employment
relationship.97 Involvement of the very party the agreement is meant to protect
attaches greater meaning and significance to the instrument.98
The purpose of IFAs is to promote fundamental labor rights by regulating
corporate conduct on a global level.99 This brings us to another key distinction
between corporate codes of conduct and IFAs: their concrete normative
content.

91.			 See Drouin, supra note 19, at 596 (listing high profile companies like Danone,
IKEA, Volkswagen, and H&M as examples of companies that have signed IFAs).
92.			 See Michael Fichter & Markus Helfen, Regulating Labor Relations in Global
Production Networks: Insights on International Framework Agreements 4 (April, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
93. See Bronstein, supra note 87, at 114 (suggesting that MNCs were motivated by
the fear of international campaigns that would tarnish their brand names).
94.			 See Owen Herrnstadt, Are International Framework Agreements a Path to
Corporate Social Responsibility?, 10 U. Pa. J. Bus. & Emp. L. 187, 187-88 (2007)
(noting that in addition to lacking real substance, most codes are initiated and finalized at
the highest level of the business enterprise with virtually no input from the workers they
supposedly are intended to benefit).
95.			 See id. at 189 (suggesting that codes were adopted in response to negative
publicity related to exploitative labor practices, not altruism).
96.			 See id. at 187 (speculating that the development of IFAs was organized labor’s
response to multinationals’ “empty gestures,” codes).
97.			 See Drouin, supra note 19, at 593 (explaining that workers are involved in the
negotiations through their union representatives).
98.			 See id. at 593–94 (contrasting IFAs to the paternalistic character of corporate
codes of conduct in that they involve workers in the negotiations, as opposed to being
unilateral instruments).
99.			 See Stevis & Boswell, supra note 88, at 175 (explaining that while not actually
collective bargaining agreements, IFAs establish certain rules aimed at corporate labor
practices).
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3. Core ILO Principles as the Substantive Content of IFAs
Whereas codes tend to be vague in their commitments, MNCs commit
themselves to concrete international labor norms through framework
agreements. The key areas of IFAs are the acceptance of the four core labor
standards, as articulated in the 1998 ILO Declaration.100 The Declaration itself
is typically not mentioned, but rather the four rights are referred to in IFAs
by their convention numbers.101 Thus, apart from a very few exceptions, IFAs
refer explicitly to ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and
the right to organize and collective bargaining, respectively.102
As previously discussed, ILO standards are the principal source of
international labor norms.103 ILO Conventions 87 and 98 are perhaps the most
important of ILO principles since the right to organize and bargain collectively
is essential to the defense of working conditions like wages, hours, and health
and safety through the collective bargaining process.104
4. Scope of IFAs, MNCs and Supply Chains
One of the most important features of IFAs is their goal of addressing
behavior not only within the signatory MNC, but along their supply chains
as well.105 According to one study, of the IFAs in existence as of 2008, eightyeight percent explicitly indicated that the norms of the agreements applied
to their subsidiaries and seventy-three percent contained provisions defining
their application to suppliers and subcontractors.106 These provisions contain

100.		 See International Labour Conference, supra note 46 (enumerating the four
fundamental labor rights: freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining
(Conventions No. 87 and No. 98); the elimination of forced and compulsory labor
(Conventions No. 29 and No. 105); the abolition of child labor (Convention No. 138);
and the elimination of discrimination in the workplace (Conventions No. 100 and No.
111)); see also Drouin, supra note 19, at 594 (pointing out that GUFs generally consider
the four rights the minimal content of an agreement without which they will refuse to
sign).
101. See Drouin, supra note 19 at 595 (explaining that many agreements increase
their legitimacy by going beyond merely referencing the four core labor standards to also
include references to working condition obligations under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the UN Global Compact).
102. See id. (noting that this provision is typically accompanied by a reference to the
specific relevant ILO core convention).
103. See Compa, supra note 1, at 7 n.8 (noting that other sources include the United
Nations declarations, covenants, and resolutions; the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines; and European human rights instruments).
104. See Wills, supra note 20, at 677, 682 (explaining that organized workers are in a
better position to negotiate favorable terms of employment than single employees).
105. See Reynald Bourque, International Framework Agreements and the Future of
Collective Bargaining in Multinational Companies, 12 Just Lab.: A Canadian J. of
Work & Soc’y 30, 37 (2008) (emphasizing that companies commit to at least inform or
encourage subcontractors and suppliers to adhere to the principles and ILO conventions
in the agreement in a large majority of IFAs).
106. See Wilke & Schütze, supra note 20, at 9–10 (suggesting that commitment to
hold supply chain actors to IFA provisions depends on the degree of power an MNC has
over them).
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varying degrees of commitment on behalf of the signatory MNC. Some MNCs
agree to place very concrete obligations on supply chain parties, going so far
as to detail sanctions to be imposed upon non-compliant suppliers.107 Others
contain provisions that are less mandatory, limiting the MNC’s obligation to
informing or encouraging its suppliers and subsidiaries to respect the principles
of the agreement. For instance, the PSA Peugeot Citroen IFA was amended
in 2010, changing its once relatively firm language by which suppliers are
“required” to make similar commitments to a much weaker provision in which
the MNC agrees to “request” that its suppliers a similar commitment in respect
of their own suppliers and sub-contractors.108
III. ANALYSIS
The principal weapon workers have to leverage their bargaining power is the
strike.109 The permanent strike replacement policy renders this weapon almost
meaningless by subjecting workers that employ it to a risk of job loss. This
practice deviates from international norms on freedom of association, the right
to organize, and bargain collectively, as enunciated in Conventions 87 and 98,
and reaffirmed in the ILO 1998 Declaration to the point of rendering the right to
strike a mere freedom to strike.110 Fortunately, IFAs have the potential to bring
many U.S. operating companies into compliance with international standards
on the right to strike, which prohibits the use of permanent replacements.
This Section first addresses the effect of the permanent replacement doctrine
on the right to strike in the United States. It next argues that as a member of the
ILO, the U.S. is obligated to amend this policy to guarantee workers protection
in their right to strike. Finally, it argues that even if the U.S. permits permanent
strike replacements, certain U.S. companies are bound to IFAs that prohibit
them from taking advantage of the policy.
A. Interference with the Right to Strike is an Abridgement of ILO Principles
Collective bargaining is the mechanism through which workers present
their demands to an employer and, through negotiations, determine the

107.		 For example, in certain cases, suppliers and subcontractors not respecting the
IFA principles may face termination of contract. See id. at 10 (identifying the IKEA IFA
as an example).
108.			International Framework Agreement on PSA Peugeot Citroën’s Social
Responsibility chapt. 4, 2006, rev’d 2010, available at http://www.imfmetal.org/
files/10052511431579/PSAIFAEnglish_revisedJune2010.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
109.		 See Bess Nkabinde, The Right to Strike, an Essential Component of Workplace
Democracy: Its Scope and Global Economy, 24 Md. J. Int’l L. 270, 279 (2009)
(emphasizing that strike action is an external source of bargaining power that is essential
to providing employers with an incentive to respond to workers’ concerns by exerting
pressure on management).
110.		 See discussion, supra Part III.A (analyzing how the Mackay doctrine is
inconsistent with Conventions 87 and 98 because it does not sufficiently protect workers
on strike, which prevents the strike action from being meaningfully considered a right).
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working conditions and terms of employment.111 The right to strike arises
most often in the context of collective bargaining, though as a weapon of
last resort.112 The employment relationship is an economic one—with most
workers’ demands encompassing improved pay or other working conditions.113
To bring balance to the employment relationship at the bargaining table, one
of the primary weapons available to workers in defending their interests is the
threat of withholding labor to inflict costs upon the employer.114 The principle
of the strike as a legitimate means of action taken by workers’ organizations
is widely recognized in countries throughout the world, almost to the point
of universal recognition.115 The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
holds the position that the right to strike is a basic consequence of the right to
organize.116
Interference or impairment of the right to strike is inconsistent with Articles
3, 8, and 10 of Convention 87 guaranteeing workers freedom of association and
the right to take concerted actions to further their interests. Article 3 recognizes
the right of workers’ organizations to organize their activities and to formulate

111.		See Bernard Gernigon, et al., ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining,
139 Int’l Lab. Rev. 33, 35 (2000) (providing the ILO’s definition of collective
bargaining: all negotiations which take place between an employer, a group of employers,
or one or more employers’ organizations, on the one hand, and one or more workers’
organizations, on the other for: (a) determining working conditions and terms of
employment; and/or (b) regulating relations between employers and workers; and/or (c)
regulating relations between employers or their organizations and a workers’ organization
or workers’ organizations).
112.		 See Bernard Gernigon et al., ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike,
137 Int’l Lab. Rev. 441, 445 (1998) (providing that the Committee on Freedom of
Association deems strikes that occur long before negotiations even take place as falling
beyond the scope of the principles of freedom of association); see also Nkabinde, supra
note 112, at 276 (discussing the imbalance in bargaining power between an employer and
employee, and suggesting that in the absence of a right to strike, collective bargaining
would amount to “collective begging”).
113.		 See Gernigon, supra note 112, at 137 (providing that the ILO Committee on
Freedom of Association has linked the exercise of the right to strike to the objective of
promoting and defending the economic and social interests of workers, thereby placing
purely politically-natured strikes beyond the purview of the Organization’s scope).
114.		 See Int’l Lab. Org., ILO General Survey on the Freedom of
Association and Collective Bargaining, ¶ 150, available at: http://www.ilo.org/
public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(1994-81-4B).pdf (conceding that the conditions and
restrictions of the right varies from country to country, however an examination of
national legislation around the globe reflects a wide recognition of the right to some
degree).
115.		 See Gernigon supra note 112, at 447–48 (emphasizing that this is the case
notwithstanding the relative frequency of national restrictions on the right, for instance,
impositions of penal sanctions for organizing or participating in unlawful strikes,
requirements of an excessively large majority of votes to be able to call a strike, bans on
strikes by public servants, and bans on strikes in certain non-essential services).
116.		 See Int’l Lab. Org., ILO General Survey on the Freedom of
Association and Collective Bargaining, ¶ 194, available at: http://www.ilo.org/
public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(1994-81-4B).pdf (referring to the right to strike as an
intrinsic corollary of the principles of freedom of association due to its effectiveness in
helping workers realize their collective demands).
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their programs.117 Article 10 states that the term “organization” means any
organization for furthering and defending the interests of workers.118 When
read together with Article 10, Article 3 protects activities and actions that are
designed to further and defend the interests of workers. Recall that strikes
are recognized as an essential means through which workers further and
defend their interests.119 Article 8 declares that no national law may impair the
guarantees of the Convention.120 Because strike action falls under the activities
protected by Article 3, which are aimed at furthering and defending workers’
interests, limitations on the right to strike may contravene Conventions 87
and 98.121 This subsection addresses the lawful practice of hiring of permanent
replacements for striking workers in the United States as it relates to ILO
principles.
1. The Use of Permanent Strike Replacements Reduces the ‘Right’ to Strike to
the Unprotected ‘Freedom’ to Strike
In refraining from ratifying ILO Conventions 87 and 98, the United
States government has insisted that U.S. law sufficiently guarantees workers
protections of the principles of freedom of association, the rights to organize,
and bargain collectively.122 While Section 13 of the NLRA addresses the right
to strike,123 in reality, enforcement of the NLRA falls short of its goals and
departs from international norms, which afford the right to strike fundamental
status.124
117. See ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 33, art. 3(1) (“Workers’ and employers’
organisations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their
representatives in full freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to
formulate their programmes”).
118.		 Id. art. 10.
119.		 See discussion, supra II.B.2 (discussing the ILO’s consideration of the right
to strike as an intrinsic corollary of freedom of association and the rights to organize
and bargain collectively, which reflects the general recognition of the right to strike as a
means of furthering workers’ interests throughout the world).
120. See ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 33, art. 8(2) (“The law of the land shall
not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees provided for
in this Convention.”).
121.		 See generally Michael Bendel, The International Protection of Trade Union
Rights: A Canadian Case Study, 13 Ottawa L. Rev. 182, 183-91 (insisting that a
reasonable interpretation of Convention No. 87 could identify an implicit recognition of
the right to strike in Convention No. 87 along with customary international law).
122.		 See Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 90 (providing documentary evidence of
the Senate’s response to President Harry S. Truman’s 1949 submission for advice and
consent regarding ratification of Convention No. 87: that revision of Federal law would
be unnecessary to effect compliance with the terms of the Convention).
123.		 See 29 U.S.C. 163 (2006) (“Nothing in this Act . . . shall be construed so as
either to interfere with or impede in any way the right to strike.”).
124.		 See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A
Historical Overview and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 441 (2002) (insisting
that in most other countries, an employee that engages in a lawful strike retains a right to
reclaim her former position at the end of a strike).
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The Mackay doctrine, permitting permanent replacement of strikers renders
the right a mere privilege, or freedom, because it removes meaningful protection
of the right by stripping employers of a duty to refrain from interference
with striking.125 Wesley Hohfeld’s famous account of legal rights provides a
useful analytical framework for distinguishing between the colloquial uses
of the “rights” and their implications.126 Under this framework, rights are
distinguished from what he calls privileges, or freedoms, by the existence or
inexistence of a corresponding duty. All rights have a corresponding duty, or
a legal obligation to respect the legal interest of the right-holder and refrain
from interfering with it.127 In the example of the right to strike, the correlative
is the employer’s duty to not interfere with the employees’ right.128 On the
other hand, a ‘freedom’ is the liberty to act, but without the imposition of a
duty upon others.129 When one has the freedom to act, others simply do not
have a right to prevent her from acting.130 In the strike context, if employees
enjoy the freedom to strike, an employer does not have the right to stop the
employees from striking, but does not have a duty to not interfere with the act
of striking.131
In establishing the Mackay permanent strike replacement Doctrine,
the Supreme Court reasoned that the ‘right’ to strike does not destroy an

125. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (giving
birth to the Mackay doctrine that allows employers to replace their economic strikers
permanently).
126.		 Welsley Hohfeld, a notable jurist of the early twentieth century, authored
the influential Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning and Other Legal Essays, which is central to modern-day understandings
of legal concepts, including the precise meanings of “right” and “duty” and their impact
on legal relations. The concept of the reciprocal relationship between right and duty is
central to Hohfeld’s analysis that challenges the generic treatment and misuses of the
word “right.” His conception of correlating rights and duties, that is that the creation
of a right in one person imposes a correlative duty on another, provides a practical test
to measure the existence of a recognized right. See David Kennedy, The Canon of
American Legal Thought 47 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006).
127.		 See Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 31 (1913) (advancing that ‘duty’ and ‘right’ are
correlative terms such that a right only exists when another person has a duty and, when a
right is invaded, a duty is violated).
128.		 Cf. Kennedy, supra note 126, at 48 (applying the Hohfeldian analysis of rights
and privileges, or freedoms, to property rights: if one has a right to exclude others from
her property, others will have a correlative duty not to trespass).
129.		 See Hohfeld, supra note 127, at 33 (emphasizing that the fundamental and
important difference between a right and a privilege is the absence of a correlative duty
of the latter. Instead, the correlative of privilege is an absence of a right of another to
prevent the privilege-holder from acting).
130. See Jon Finelli, Comment, In Re Costas: The Misapplication of Section 548(a) to
Disclaimer Law, 14 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 567, 585 n. 113 (2006) (articulating that
the ‘absence of right,’ or a no-right, is the correlative of privilege).
131.		 See Hohfeld, supra note 127, at 37 (asserting that it is incorrect to conflate
right with freedom since the existence of a freedom imparts no duty on another to refrain
from interfering. In order to transform a freedom into a right, a duty to not interfere must
be established).
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employer’s right to protect and continue business by filling the vacancies
of the strikers.132 In so holding, the Court actually transformed the ‘right’ to
strike it into the ‘freedom’ to strike by removing a corresponding affirmative
duty not to interfere with the exercise of the right from the employer.133 The
hire of permanent replacements interferes with strike action by inflicting
substantial repercussions upon the employees that undertake the action, loss of
employment opportunities.134
The Mackay doctrine forces an employee to choose to strike—at the risk
of losing the very job that is the object of the gains and benefits sought—
rendering the act virtually useless.135 The threat of being permanently replaced
has, in fact, discouraged workers from exercising their ‘right’ to strike.136
Application of the Mackay doctrine produces results that are inconsistent
with the NLRA’s provisions regarding protected activity, making the diminution
of protection for striking employees even more apparent. In recognizing an
employer right to hire permanent replacements, the Mackay Court created
a loophole for employers who otherwise are prohibited from firing striking
employees under the Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, which proscribes retaliation
against employees that engage in protected union activity.137 While the act of
permanently replacing strikers is lawful, firing strikers is unlawful, although
both acts produce the same result: loss of a job as a consequence of striking.138
The result renders the NLRA’s protections for striking workers a dead letter.
Although employers have a duty to refrain from retaliation against workers
132.		 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (“Nor
was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees with others in an effort to
carry on the business. Although section 13 of the [NLRA] provides, ‘Nothing in this Act
. . . shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike,’ it does not follow that an employer . . . has lost the right to protect and continue
his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge
those hired to fill the place of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their
employment, in order to create places for them.”).
133.		 Cf. Hohfeld, supra note 127, at 31 (reiterating that a right cannot exist
without a corresponding duty on others to refrain from interference).
134.		 It is important to note that it is unlawful for an employer to terminate an
employee who chooses to strike; such an employee retains employment status and
is eligible for reinstatement as hired strike replacements leave and create openings.
However, the effect of the permanent strike replacement doctrine may be that the
employee faces an indefinite period waiting for a vacancy in order to resume work. See
Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345–56 (upholding that employees exercising their right to
strike remain employees notwithstanding that an employer is not obligated to reinstate
them upon termination of the strike).
135.		 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 Colum.
L. Rev. 1527, 1538 (2002) (likening the effect of the permanent replacement doctrine to
employee “suicide”).
136.		 See Befort, supra note 124, at 440–41 (presenting data from a study that
reveals a sharp decline in strike activity accompanying a significant increase in the use of
permanent strike replacements in the eighties).
137.		 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting employers from firing employees
on the basis of union or otherwise concerted activity).
138.		 See James Gray Pope, How Americans Lost Their Right to Strike, and Other
Tales, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 518, 529 (2004) (pointing out that the effect creates a
disincentive for employees to engage in “protected” concerted activity).
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engaged in union activity in the form of firing, employers do not have a duty
to refrain from reaching the same result through a different tactic—permanent
replacement.139 Thus, this removal of a duty to refrain from interference
renders the ‘right’ to strike, an unprotected ‘freedom’ to strike that yields to an
employer’s corresponding freedom to replace strikers.140 In other words, the
Mackay doctrine preserves the NLRA Section 13 reference to strike action as
a lawful recourse for workers, but not one afforded the status of a protected
right.		
2. The U.S. Fails to Live up to its Commitment as Member of the ILO in
Promulgating its Labor Policy Allowing for the Use of Permanent Strike
Replacements
In sanctioning the permanent strike replacement, the United States fails to
uphold its commitment as a member of the ILO to guarantee the right to strike.
Although the United States has not ratified ILO Conventions 87 and 98, which
are the basis for the right to strike, as a member of the ILO it has certain duties
related to the principles set therein. The 1998 Declaration obligates member
states to respect, to promote, and to realize, in good faith and in accordance
with the ILO Constitution, the core principles concerning fundamental
rights, which include freedom of association and the right to organize.141 This
obligation arises out of the fact of membership, without regard to ratification
of the underlying Conventions.142 In other words, the obligation exists for all
members, independently of specific obligations ratifying governments are
subject to.
While the commitment to respect principles does not rise to the level of
a legal obligation, it remains significant.143 The Declaration established a
new monitoring procedure to review government and private sector conduct,
139.		 See id. at 527 (viewing an employer’s right to hire permanent replacements,
which the Mackay Court considered a constitutional property right, as trumping
employees’ rights under Section 7 of the NLRA).
140.		As the Mackay Court mistakenly referred to the ‘right’ to strike, so too did it
mislabel an employer’s ‘right’ to continue operations as a ‘right’ since employees do not
have a corresponding duty not to interfere with this right, for strikes invariably interfere
with business operations. See Kennedy, supra note 126, at 50 (citing Wesley Hohfeld’s
assessment of an employer’s right to earn a living as a privilege, or freedom, since a
union has no duty not to interfere with the employer’s contractual relations).
141.		 See Francis Maupain, Revitalization not Retreat: The Real Potential of the 1998
ILO Declaration for the Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L.
439, 445, 448 (2005) (explaining the relationship between the ILO Constitution and the
1998 Declaration, whereby the latter expanded and made concrete specific principles and
attached special significance to them by establishing practical consequences to them).
142. . See Laurence R. Helfer, The Law and Politics of International Delegation:
Monitoring Compliance with Unratified Treaties: The ILO Experience, 71 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 193, 204 (2008) (comparing the 1998 Declaration to the WTO, which
conditions membership to the organization on acceptance of certain commitments).
143.		 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (establishing the foundational rule of the international legal system: a treaty
does not create obligations or rights for a state without its consent).
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providing for an increased level of scrutiny regarding fundamental rights.144
Under its “follow-up” mechanism, members that have not ratified one or more
of the fundamental conventions are subject to annual review of the status of
the relevant rights and principles within their borders.145 This review is based
on annual reports filed by the government with optional comments from
employers and workers’ organizations.146 Additionally, member states accept
jurisdiction and review by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association of
complaints filed against them under the underlying conventions.147
The Committee on Freedom of Association has had opportunity to review
the United States’ policy on permitting the hire of permanent replacements for
workers that exercise their right to strike through the complaint process.148 The
Committee reaffirmed the basic right to strike as an essential means through
which workers defend their interests and found that the U.S. permanent
strike replacement policy contravenes freedom of association principles. The
Committee concluded that the right to strike is not truly guaranteed when a
worker who exercises it runs the risk of permanently losing her job to another
worker.149 In light of its findings, the Committee issued a recommendation
advising the government to consider the practice’s derogation from the right to
strike.150 Nonetheless, despite this formal recognition of the law’s detrimental
effect on workers’ rights, an employer may still hire permanent replacement

144.		 See Christopher R. Coxson, Comment, The 1998 ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: Promoting Labor Law Reforms Through
the ILO as an Alternative to Imposing Coercive Trade Sanctions, 17 Dick. J. Int’l L.
469, 470 (1999) (indicating that the follow-up procedure was intended to encourage
governments to adopt standards consistent with the fundamental principles identified in
the Declaration).
145.		 See ILO Principles on Fundamental Rights, supra note 46, annex, (establishing
the follow-up mechanism as a review of efforts made by member states to comply with
the Declaration so as to ultimately promote full compliance).
146.		 See Maupain, supra note 141, at 446 (acknowledging that the follow-up system
was, in part, established out of a recognition of a mutual obligation of the organization
to assist members in the fulfillment of their obligation under the Declaration and that it
reveals the obstacles preventing the realization of principles and rights and determines
what assistance governments require to overcome them).
147.		 See Compa,, supra note 6, at 46 (describing the United States’ support behind
the adoption of the 1998 Declaration, and noting U.S. Labor Secretary Alexis Herman’s
response to the adoption: “‘ILO members have accepted the need to be accountable,
and with this action there will now be a process within the ILO to demonstrate that
accountability.’”)
148.		 See generally Freedom of Asssoication, supra note 6 (presenting its findings
based on the investigation of a complaint submitted to the Committee by the AFLCIO against the United States charging that the Mackay doctrine violates principles of
freedom of association and the rights to organize and bargain collectively).
149.		 See id. ¶ 92 (determining that forcing an employee to choose between striking
and retaining her position renders the right meaningless).
150.		 See id. ¶ 93 (informing the Govorning Body that the use of non-union labour
during a time of strike may affect the free exercise of trade union rights).
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workers during a strike.151 Twenty years later, this has been cause for continued
scrutiny by the Committee on Freedom of Association.152
Having been alerted to the detrimental effect of the Mackay Doctrine,
continued inaction to guarantee the right to strike evidences a lack of respect
and implementation of the principle. The object of the monitoring powers is
to promote ratification of the conventions through gradual implementation of
recommendations.153 Because the U.S. is not legally bound to implement such
recommendations does not remove its normative obligations as a member.
The purpose of the ILO Declaration was to attach greater significance
to certain principles the ILO deemed to be fundamental labor rights.154 As
discussed in the preceding subsection, the Mackay Doctrine in the United
States has diminished the status of strike action from a right to a freedom.155
The rationale behind the U.S. policy on strike replacements is that workers’
interests must be balanced against an employer’s interest in protecting its
business.156 This balancing test is evidence that the right to strike does not
rise to the level of a fundamental right in the United States. To illustrate this
point, consider U.S. policy regarding the constitutionally-guaranteed freedom
of religion in the employment context.157 Employers in the United States are
required to accommodate employees’ religious observances.158 For instance, a
hospital may not terminate and replace a nurse due to her refusal to perform
a certain procedure on the basis of moral objections based on her religious

151.		In 1994, democratic senator Howard Metzenbaum introduced a bill that would
prohibit the hiring of permanent strike replacements, the “Striker Replacement Bill,”
but opponents successfully filibustered the bill, blocking floor consideration. See U.S.
Senate: Legislation & Records Home, U.S. Senate Role Call Votes, 103d Congress, 2d
Session, available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_
vote_cfm.cfm?congress=103&session=2&vote=00189.
152.		 See, e.g., Int’l Lab. Org., Country Baseline Under the ILO Declaration Annual
Review (2000-2010): United States 214 (2010) available at http:// www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/ wcms_091265.pdf
(highlighting the law embodied in the Mackay doctrine as a continued challenge in the
realization of the fundamental rights of freedom of association and meaningful collective
bargaining and the United State’s failure to produce evidence of progress).
153.		 See Helfer, supra note 142, at 201 (discussing how monitoring allows
government to submit documentation on their progress of implementation and permits the
ILO to make recommendations for improvement).
154.		 See Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 92 (explaining that the greater significance
attaches by committing member states to the proposition that ILO membership implies an
obligation to respect certain principles by virtue of membership alone).
155.		 See discussion, supra III.A.1 (discussing the lack of adequate protections of
the striking workers as evidence that the ‘right’ to strike is in fact only the ‘freedom’ to
strike).
156.		 See Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345 (identifying the Fifth Amendment property
rights as the source of an the employer’s right to protect and continue business).
157.		 See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . ”).
158.		 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(j) (2006) (declaring unlawful discrimination of
employees based on religion).
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beliefs.159 This example illustrates how, unlike the right to strike, rights
deemed fundamental are sufficient to overcome employer interests to operate
a business.
The Committee on Freedom of Association has taken the position that
national legislation should provide for genuine protection of the right to
strike to prevent derogation of its meaning.160 Governments must not take
any action that infringes on the right to strike.161 Governments must also act
affirmatively to prevent private actors from interfering with the exercise of
the right.162 In this way, employers’ hire of permanent strike replacements
requires that government intervene to prevent such action.163 In neglecting to
amend its policy on permanent strike replacements to guarantee protections of
striking workers, the U.S. government fails to attach the status fundamental
right to strike action, and thereby fails to live up to its commitment to respect
fundamental ILO principles.
3. IFAs Bind Certain U.S. Companies to ILO Principles that are Violated by
the Use of Permanent Strike Replacements
Although IFAs are not legally enforceable instruments, they nonetheless
offer a promising tool to hold private actors in the United States to ILO
standards even when national labor laws fail to hold MNCs accountable.164 The
United States’ apparent reluctance to conform its strike law with ILO standards
does not preclude unions from bringing complaints to an IFA signatory MNC
whose U.S. based subsidiaries and suppliers take advantage of the Mackay
Doctrine and hire replacements for striking workers.
159.		 See, e.g., Swanson v. St. John’s Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702, 709–10 (Mont.
1979) (finding that no hardship resulted to the hospital when a nurse refused to participate
in a sterilization procedure on account of her religion and holding that her dismissal was
unlawful).
160.		 See Int’l Lab. Org., ILO General Survey on the Freedom of
Association and Collective Bargaining, ¶ 139, available at: http://www.ilo.org/
public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(1994-81-4B).pdf (discussing the maintenance of the
employment relationship as fundamental to the right to strike and providing examples of
various ways nations leave the right devoid of content by effectively allowing termination
of the employment relationship, as in when employers replace strikers with new recruits
or when strikers are targeted for disciplinary actions like transfers, dismissals, or
demotions).
161.		 See id. (identifying the right to strike as conceptually a negative right in that
workers theoretically are free to exercise their right to strike if just left alone by the state).
162. . See id. (discussing that in some instances, workers need protections from the
state in order to freely exercise this right and, in this way, the right is also a positive
right).
163. . Accord id. at 284 (arguing that a government is not meeting its international
human rights obligations if it permits private actors to violate workers’ rights with
impunity).
164.		 See Drouin, supra note 19, at 612 (emphasizing that the absence of the threat of
legal sanctions does not render IFAs meaningless since compliance largely depends on a
company’s motivations for signing an IFA in the first place and in most cases will provide
an incentive to remain faithful to obligations for fear of brand tarnishing).
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Subsidiaries and suppliers are bound to signatory MNCs through express
provisions in IFAs in which the MNC commits to promote implementation
of the IFA along its supply chain.165 While actual terms of IFAs vary, many
provide for mechanisms that monitor compliance of supply chain actors and
sanctions for noncompliance. For example, H&M’s IFA with Union Network
International contains a provision for unannounced audits of suppliers’ factories
and termination of business relations upon continued non-compliance.166
The enforceability of IFAs upon suppliers and subsidiaries operating in
the United States and elsewhere lies not in the threat of legal sanctions for
noncompliance, but in “shame sanctions.”167 As discussed earlier, MNCs
typically sign IFAs in part to enhance their reputation as socially responsible
actors.168 In this way, IFAs give MNCs an incentive to ensure compliance with
business partners whose noncompliant conduct can be linked to the MNC
subjecting the MNC to the risk of unfavorable publicity.
U.S. operating subsidiaries and suppliers charged with accusations of
noncompliance with an operating IFA frequently argue that the company’s
conduct conforms with national law and practice and thereby fulfills any
obligations it has pursuant to the IFA.169 This raises the question: when national
law appears to overlap with international norms with regard to IFA provisions,
which standard governs compliance?170 U.S. labor law’s failure to reflect
international standards, as illustrated with its laws governing the right to strike,
underscores the importance of resolving this issue. A careful examination of
the typical IFA which includes European-style protection of the right to strike,
indicate that IFAs bind suppliers and subsidiaries to ILO principles regarding
the right to strike.
In determining which set of standards signatory MNCs, which, for the most
part are based in Europe, intend to bind supply chain actors to—ILO principles
or national law—an examination of the norms of their home countries is
informative. Unlike in the United States, the right to strike is constitutionally

165.		 See id at 624 (conceding that although the majority of IFAs contain provisions
regarding expectations that suppliers and subsidiaries respect the principles contained
in the IFA, in practice, MNCs still frequently fail to ensure that supply chain actors, are
adequately informed of the existence of an agreement or monitored for compliance with
the terms contained in the IFA).
166.		 See Hammer, supra note 85, at 526 (providing provisional language).
167.		 See Molly Beutz Land, International Law and Democratic Considerations:
Peer Producing Human Rights, 46 Alberta L. Rev. 1115, 1118 (2009) (describing the
“name and shame” process of publicizing an actor’s record with regard to human rights in
an effort to pressure the actor into changing its conduct).
168.		 See Drouin, supra note 19, at 607 (identifying other motivations; including a
desire to avoid government or regulatory intervention, profit anticipation, the desire to
promote a positive public image and altruism).
169.		 See Herrnstadt, supra note 94, at 199 (providing a U.S. based subsidiary’s
response to complaint alleging breach of the IFA signed by its European parent company:
“. . . The [company] adheres to the principles and values stipulated by the [IFA]. It
believes . . . that such application must be carried out while observing legal regulations,
practices, and cultures within the countries welcoming our presence.”).
170.		 See id. (arguing that vague language in IFAs leave this open for debate).
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protected in many European countries.171 In fact, labor laws in the United States
are not grounded in fundamental rights at all: Congress derived its authority to
enact labor legislation on its constitutional power to regulate interstate business
under the commerce clause.172 The purpose behind the NLRA was to avoid
the disruptions of commerce arising from industrial strife that the adversarial
and unequal employment relationship inevitably creates.173 The result is that in
the United States workers’ mere statutorily-created rights frequently yield to
employer rights and economic interests.174
In contrast, workers’ rights are treated as fundamental in Europe and receive
broad protections. For instance, Article 28 of the Charter of the Fundamental
Rights of the European Union includes the right of workers to take strike
action to defend their interests.175 In a landmark case, the European Court of
Justice was confronted with the task of striking a balance between economic
freedoms and fundamental social rights, namely, the right to take collective
action, including the right to strike. In The International Transport Workers’
Federation v. Viking Line ABP (Viking), a Finnish trade union implemented a
strike to prevent a ferry boat operator from moving its operations to Estonia
to benefit from lower wage levels.176 In an opinion that came as a surprise
to the international labor community, the Court emphasized the importance
of freedom of movement in business undertakings to the point that in some

171.		 For example, France, Italy, and Spain recognize a constitutional right to strike.
Moreover, the right encompasses broader action than in the United States, for instance,
sympathy strikes, which are unlawful in the U.S. See James Atleson, The Voyage of the
Neptune Jade: The Perils and Promises of Transnational Labor Solidarity, 52 Buffalo
L. Rev. 85, 166 (2004).
172.		 See Lance Compa, The ILO Core Standards Declaration: Changing the
Climate for Changing the Law, Perspectives on Work 24 (2003) http://digitalcommons.
ilr.cornell.edu/articles/179/ (arguing that if Congress had grounded the NLRA and labor
rights in fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution, such a foundation would have
made application of international human rights standards to domestic labor law easier).
173.		 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (declaring the NLRA’s policy to eliminate
obstructions to the free flow of commerce through promotion of collective bargaining,
based on findings that the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
the flow of commerce by restoring the balance of power between employers and
employees, enabling peaceful resolution of disputes).
174.		 For example, that employers are legally permitted to mount aggressive antiunion campaigns that often contain factual misrepresentations about unions is justified by
employers’ First Amendment free speech rights. See James A. Gross, A Human Rights
Perspective on United States Labor Relations Law: A Violation of the Right of Freedom
of Association, 3 Empl. Rts. & Employ. Pol’y J. 65, 89 (1999).
175.		 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 17, Dec. 7,
2000 O.J. (C 364) (“Workers and employers, or their respective organizations, have, in
accordance with Community law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate
and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of
interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.”).
176.		 See Case C-438/05, Int’l Transport Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007
ECJ (Dec. 11, 2007) (“the right to strike, must therefore be recognised as a fundamental
right which forms an integral part of the general principles of Community law the
observance of which the Court ensures”).
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instances, collective action may yield to it.177 Nevertheless, the Court held that
the right to strike was so fundamental to the protection of workers that the
strike in this case was justified.178 The outcome of that case is indicative of
the European Union’s commitment to the protection of the fundamental right
to strike. Since the majority of IFAs are signed by European MNCs, it is a
safe presumption that they envisioned protection of the right to strike under
European standards, which reflect the ILO’s norms.
Language of typical IFAs provide concrete evidence that subsidiaries and
suppliers of signatory MNCs are bound to ILO principles concerning the
fundamental right to strike. Express reference to ILO Conventions 87 and 98,
confirm the signatories’ objectives to promote adherence to ILO standards
when they exceed national standards.179 For instance, the Swedish construction
MNC, Skanska, which has operations in the United States, commits to comply
with national legislation and all ILO Conventions and Recommendations in
its IFA.180 The company further commits to apply the IFA to its subsidiaries,
explicitly referring to ILO Conventions 87 and 98 regarding their employees’
right to organize.181 Thus the IFA clearly articulates the ILO principles as the
applicable standard with regard to the right to strike, which constitutes an
intrinsic corollary of the Conventions referred to in the IFA. Another MNC,
IKEA, indicates in its IFA the company’s intention to establish its suppliers’
compliance with minimum labor standards through contracts based on
requirements stated in its Code of Conduct, found in the annex of the IFA.182
The Code of Conduct identifies specific ILO Conventions as primary principles
guiding minimum conduct.183
Moreover, IFAs were developed in response to national laws that unions
viewed as inadequate in meeting international standards.184 As discussed
previously, IFAs, unlike voluntary codes of conduct, are agreements reflecting

177.		 See id. (recognizing the exercise of the right to strike may be subject to certain
restrictions).
178.		 See id. (holding the right to strike is to be protected in accordance with
Community law, national law and national practices).
179.		 See Wilke & Schütze, supra note 20, at 7 (finding that more than half of IFAs
expressly refer to these Conventions by number).
180.		 See Skanska, International Framework Agreement Between Skanska and
IFBWW 1 (2001), http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?index=43 (last visited October 29,
2011) (explaining that compliance must be practiced by “all units and subsidiaries of the
Skanska Group”). .
181.		 See id. (indicating that the company and its representatives are obliged to
respect its workers’ union activities).
182.		 See IKEA, International Framework Agreement Between IKEA and
IFBWW,Building and Wood Worker’s International (Dec. 19, 2001), http://www.
bwint.org/default.asp?index=46&Language=EN (indicating that IKEA has formed a
compliance organisation to support and monitor compliance with these contracts).
183.		 See id. (referring to the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work).
184.		 See Herrnstadt, supra note 94, at 190 (explaining that unions sought to compel
companies to exceed their obligations under international laws).
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negotiations between global unions and MNCs.185 Global unions would have
little incentive to negotiate an IFA that merely holds suppliers and subsidiaries
to national law that they are already required to follow, making the conclusion
that suppliers and subsidiaries are bound to ILO principles, not national
principles reasonable.
Under ILO norms, the right to strike has been interpreted as an essential
element of freedom of association.186 As discussed earlier, the Mackay Doctrine
is incompatible with Conventions 87 and 98 because it fails to provide
adequate protections for workers on strike, thereby stripping the strike action
of its status as a right.187 Thus, a U.S. subsidiary or supplier of an MNC that is
party to an IFA availing itself of its right to hire permanent replacements for
striking workers can be held accountable to its parent MNC and the signatory
global union for noncompliance with the IFA, even though its conduct fully
comports with U.S. law.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States should ratify ILO Conventions 87 and 98 to give full effect
to the guarantee of the right to strike. This will create pressure for lawmakers to
amend domestic law to bring it into compliance with international standards,
under which the right to strike is so fundamental as to prohibit employer
interference in the form of hiring strike replacements. However, short of this,
IFAs should be strengthened, both in language and implementation to compel
U.S. companies to abstain from availing themselves of the Mackay doctrine.
A. Congress Should Ratify ILO Conventions 87 and 98 and Reverse the
Mackay Permanent Replacement Doctrine to Bring the Right to Strike into
Compliance with International Standards that Make it a Fundamental Right
Congress should ratify ILO Conventions 87 and 98 as a demonstration of
its commitment to fundamental labor rights.188 These Conventions provide
analogous, albeit stronger, protections to many of those already afforded
under U.S. law, and ratification would not require drastic changes to the law,

185.		 See discussion, supra II.C.1 (discussing IFAs as a response to codes of conduct
that fail to hold MNCs accountable).
186.		 See Int’l Lab. Org., ILO General Survey on the Freedom of
Association and Collective Bargaining, ¶ 149, available at: http://www.ilo.org/
public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(1994-81-4B).pdf (declaring strike action as an activity
of workers’ organizations as intrinsic to freedom of association and the right to organize
and bargain collectively because it is the principal means through which workers’ defend
their interests).
187.		 Accord id. ¶¶ 144–50 (expressing that the ILO Committee on the Freedom of
Association considers this right essential to the other guarantees of Conventions 87 and
98, which would otherwise remain a dead letter).
188.		 But cf. Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 103 (lamenting that the U.S. Labor
Department’s position is that the U.S. will not ratify any ILO convention until U.S. law
and practice is in full conformity with its provisions).
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especially regarding the right to strike.189 However, ratification of Conventions
87 and 98 would pressure U.S. lawmakers to amend the Mackay Doctrine to
bring the right to strike into compliance with ILO standards, which condemns
the use of permanent strike replacements.
Congress should enact legislation that prohibits the hiring of permanent
replacements for workers that exercise their right to strike, to give full effect
to the right that exists under ILO standards.190 The use of permanent strike
replacements bears little difference from the dismissal of workers that strike,
which is unlawful and therefore, should also be prohibited. Instead, employers
should have to dismiss any temporary replacements it hires once the strike
ceases and employees elect to return to their former positions.191
B. IFAs Implementation Should be Enhanced to Provide for Greater
Monitoring and Enforcement all Along Supply Chains Through Involvement
of National Unions and Stronger Language
Global unions should ensure that national unions from countries in which
signatory MNCs have operations are included in the negotiation process of
IFAs.192 As instruments that lack legal enforceability, IFAs depend on local trade
unions for effective implementation, which requires widespread awareness
about IFAs.193 Comprehensive enforcement requires the participation and
communication of all relevant actors at the inception of the process to ensure

189. See Seckman, supra note 10, at 695 (insisting that U.S. law frequently extends
equal or greater protections to U.S. workers than many ILO conventions, for instance, the
ILO calls for protection of fewer classes than U.S. law does under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act and the Americans with Disability Act).
190.		 See Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong;
Can We Fix it?, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 125, 139 (2003) (arguing that the Mackay Doctrine
weakens the strike weapon to the extent of destroying collective bargaining, which makes
unionization meaningless).
191.		 This is the existing policy for workers that go on strike to protest an employer’s
unfair labor practices, Congress’ repeal of the Mackay doctrine should not pose a
significant problem, since it only involves removing the distinction separating economic
strikes from unfair labor strikes. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1368 (1986)
(holding that an employer whose workers strike over the employer’s unfair labor practice
must reinstate the striking employees to their former positions, discharging replacements
hired during the strike if necessary).
192.		 Cf. Stevis & Boswell, supra note 88, at 185 (reporting that until now,
most national unions that have been involved in the signing of agreements are those
that are from the same country as the signatory MNC, and very few national unions
from host countries of MNCs’ have been involved); see Hammer, supra note 88,
at 525 (maintaining that the strength of IFAs depends on union involvement with
implementation at the local level).
193.		 Cf. id. at 186 (attributing low participation of unions outside of Europe in the
implementation of IFAs to lack of knowledge of their existence).
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monitoring at all stages of the supply chain.194 Global unions should provide
trainings for national union leaders around the world to gather information
about MNC operations in their countries and provide information about IFAs
as a tool for organizing.195 To promote enforcement, national unions should
inform employees of subsidiaries and suppliers that are bound to IFAs about
the existence of IFAs, and provide trainings on identifying and reporting
violations of the terms of the IFA.
Violations of IFAs must be systematically reported. Reported violations
should be publicized and widely disseminated throughout countries where
the signatory MNC has operations to pressure it into compelling its supply
chain business partners into compliance.196 Additionally, violations that are
inconsistent with core ILO labor standards and reveal a member state’s failure
to enforce such standards, like the Mackay Doctrine in the U.S., should be
submitted as a report to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, which
can then be used as negative publicity.197
For IFAs to live up to their potential as private agreements that compel
MNCs into compliance with international norms in every country in which
they operate, global unions must insist on precise, firm language that explicitly
makes clear subsidiary and supplier obligations to comply with its provisions,
including the right to strike.198 Vague references to measures informing
subsidiaries and suppliers of the IFA should be replaced with firm and explicit
commitment to require implementation of agreement at the supply chain level,
under threat of express sanctions. IFAs should include a clause that provides that
whenever a provision is a subject of both national and international regulation,
international standards prevail.199 Lastly, IFAs must include provisions of
specific plan aimed at implementation the IFA along the supply chain level,

194.		 See, e.g. Wills, supra note 20, at 691–94 (describing events that took place
during an unsuccessful organizing drive of a French-owned hotel in New York that went
on for ten years until local organizers learned of the existence of the IFA the company
had signed with a global union in Europe which spurred transnational cooperation that
promptly pressured the hotel to recognize the union and negotiate a first contract).
195.		 See Wills, supra note 20, at 685 (clarifying that IFAs are not a substitute for
local or national collective bargaining, rather, IFAs facilitate the organizing and collective
bargaining process by committing companies to respect workers’ freedom to organize).
196.		 Cf. Drouin, supra note 19, at 607 (discussing that MNC’s desire to promote
public image is an incentive that drives them to sign IFAs).
197.		 See ILO Complaint Against the United States, Case No. 1543, supra note 6,
¶ 93 (issuing a recommendation to the U.S. on the Mackay doctrine’s deviation from
international labor standards in the form of a report).
198.		 Cf. Drouin, supra note 19, at 621 (pointing out that weak provisions found in
many IFAs, including commitments to ‘encourage’ suppliers and subsidiaries to comply
with the IFA had led to stipulations regarding the extent to which those actors are truly
obligated to adhere to the IFA terms).
199.		 See Herrnstadt, supra note 94, at 189 (raising the fundamental question,
whether IFAs bind parties to national law or international standards, arising out of vague
language leading MNCs to argue that compliance with national standards is sufficient to
effectuate compliance).
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for example, providing for a monitoring mechanism, informational programs
and trainings of workers, and reporting mechanisms.200
IV. CONCLUSION
By permitting employers to hire permanent replacements for striking
workers, the United States fails to give full guarantee of the internationallyrecognized right to strike despite its commitment as a member of the ILO.
IFAs can be an effective tool to raise standards among employers compelling
them to comply with international standards in labor law even when it exceeds
the protections provided by national law. Enforcing this standard would
prevent employers from permanently replacing workers that strike, thereby
guaranteeing full protections of the right to strike.

200.		 Cf. id. at 201 (arguing that proper enforcement of IFA provisions requires a
monitoring system).

